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Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

It is now almost eleven years since the military regime in Jakarta launched its invasion of East Timor, and more than ten since the rubber-stamp Indonesian parliament passed a bill formally incorporating that country into Indonesia as its twenty-seventh province. Yet, as Murray Kempton, the most eminent of American journalists, noted last November: "Indonesia now has as many and possibly more troops in East Timor than on the day of the initial invasion. . . Indonesia explains that the Timorese are pacified and content and grateful for their new roads and new literacy. There are, it concedes, 200 or so guerrillas still resisting--with unheard of vehemence and pertinacity, we may assume, since it takes a 10,000 member army to contain them."

The best explanation for this situation was unwittingly given by no less than President Suharto in the course of last year's Independence Day address to the Indonesian nation. On that occasion he said: "A fighter in the struggle, whose slogan is 'once a fighter, always a fighter,' will never cease fighting for the nation's ideals so long as he is alive." He was of course referring to Indonesia's own four-year-long struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism (in which he himself played an active and honorable part), a struggle which involved much death and destruction, though nothing comparable to what Suharto has visited on the East Timorese. The tragedy is that he has always obdurately overlooked the truth of his own words when dealing with the nation of East Timor.

What is the condition of East Timor today, after eleven years of foreign occupation? Reliable information is difficult to obtain. Nothing better demonstrates the failure of the Suharto regime's policies

and its bad conscience over the suffering it has inflicted on the people of East Timor than the fact that it keeps the country in the strictest isolation it can manage. Few foreigners have been permitted entry, and none has been allowed to travel freely or talk frankly with the local people. Even Indonesians are required to have permits to enter what the regime claims is part of their own motherland. East Timor has no local press, and it is impossible to make long distance telephone calls in or out of the country. The surrounding seas are strictly patrolled, and the overwhelming bulk of the 1,000 or so passengers who fly in and out of Dili each month are civilian occupation officials, of whom about 15,000 are now stationed in the territory. The Indonesian press itself operates under tight government controls so that the Indonesian reading public has only the sketchiest idea of what is going on.

Nonetheless, a good deal can be learned from the unwary statements by Indonesian officials themselves. In significant ways these statements confirm what Amnesty International, representatives of the free East Timorese people, and various academic observers have already, or will shortly, be describing to you.

We may begin by noting that according to the Indonesian regime's own census figures for 1980, the population of East Timor was then 555,350. By contrast, the Portuguese colonial census of 1970 gave a population of 609,477, and census officials in 1974 estimated that by then the figure had risen to about 650,000. Thus in the six years between 1974 and 1980, by conservative estimate approximately 100,000 East Timorese, or 15% of the population, were wiped out by war, famine, and associated disease. A comparable percentage of the population of the United States today would mean 36,000,000 dead. The inferences to

be drawn from the censuses are confirmed by Mario Carrascalao, the Suharto regime's governor in Dili, who last year told Reuters' correspondent Peter Millership that at least 100,000 East Timorese had died untimely deaths since 1975. He went on to speak of 20,000 orphans, 11,000 abandoned children, and 8,000 crippled or maimed. For America, this would be equivalent to 8,600,000 orphans, 4,600,000 abandoned children and 3,600,000 crippled or maimed. Yet the immediate architect of this catastrophe, General Leonardus "Benny" Murdani, visiting the Indonesian troops in Dili last Christmas, had the effrontery to remind them that, as he put it, "The teachings of Christ are love and peace."

Nor did the death and destruction cease after the terrible antipopulation campaigns of 1975-79. Last year's Amnesty International report listed the "disappearance" of at least 550 East Timorese noncombattant civilians since 1979. For this and other reasons, which Amnesty has amply documented, the Nobel-Prize winning organization--
which, I note, has never been permitted to conduct an investigation either in Indonesia or East Timor--decided to make the case of East Timor one of its four major international campaigns last year--after 11 years of Indonesian occupation. Amnesty International does not make such decisions lightly.

What can we learn of social conditions after 10 years of so-called integration into Indonesia? Again, some of the most damaging information comes to us from Indonesian state officials. The 1980 census reveals that in that year 79% of the East Timor population was illiterate, and 67% had no speaking use of bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national language--which, by the way, is an exceptionally easy language to pick up. The situation has not much changed since then, to judge

from a statement made last September by Clementino dos Reis Amaral, an East Timorese member of Indonesia's puppet parliament. Reporting on a visit by that parliament's Commission I to East Timor the previous month, he complained that "the use of the Indonesian language there is still uncommon." Ten years after integration--and in spite of General Murdani's peace and love. Last December, the secretary of the provincial government in Dili conceded that no more than 13 East Timorese have received BA degrees, and all were obtained outside East Timor, since there is no university or college in the territory itself. Governor Carrascalao too recently complained that he had no more than 1,000 native East Timorese officials who were literate--in any language. Small wonder that East Timor continues to be governed by a horde of foreign, i.e., Indonesian, civil and military bureaucrats.

But even if the educational and literacy levels in integrated East Timor are so abysmally low, perhaps at least economic progress has been made? Not if a cautious pronouncement last year by the Indonesian parliament's Commission VIII is to be believed. The Commission stated that 70% of the province's housing failed to meet minimum health conditions; 60% of the territory's area was inaccessible by road; 30% of the population lived below even the Indonesian government's very low official poverty line; and the Ministry of Social Affairs, which is responsible for providing the state's medical and other welfare services, had not a single operational unit outside the city of Dili. Ten years after integration.

But perhaps now at least normal social life has returned to East Timor? The courageous Apostolic Administrator in Dili, Monsignor Carlos Ximenes Belo, stated last year that: "People, including me, feel as if

we are in a jail in our own country." He personally had good reason for saying so insofar as the Suharto regime took six months to grant the exit-permit that would allow him to visit his spiritual superior, Pope John Paul, in Rome. But even more revealing are the remarks of Governor Carrascalao, who told Asiaweek correspondent Andree Feillard in July 1985 that: "The people have not felt free in their movements. This is very much against the habits of the East Timorese. The Timorese are no longer people who can talk openly to each other . . . The Timorese can not [even] produce food the way they would like." What he meant by the final, somewhat cryptic words can be inferred from an additional comment he made that in the nine years between 1976 and 1985, the population of Dili increased tenfold, from 8,000 to 80,000. This huge migration has certainly not been caused by the city's bright lights, but rather by intolerably oppressive conditions in the home-villages of the unfortunate farmer-refugees. Ten years after integration.

To round out the picture, we may finally turn to the independence struggle itself. Other witnesses present here today will be able to speak far more authoritatively on this struggle than I. But once again, we can learn a good deal from pronouncements by highly-placed officials of the Suharto regime. About this time last year, these officials were loudly celebrating the surrender of a guerrilla commander named Mauk Moruk, whose importance was underlined for the Indonesian press by the fact that he brought in 200 other guerrillas with him. Unluckily, a few months earlier a leading military spokesman had stated that there were no more than 200 "bandits" left in the entire country. Had this been true, Moruk's surrender with his 200 men would have ended the fighting. But of course it was not true. General Murdani conceded as much last

October when he told Asiaweek correspondent Feillard that all that remained was "Xanana [commander of the East Timor nationalist guerrillas] with 100, 200, 1,000 . . . 2,000 men." Since the latter figure is twenty times larger than the former, one gets the impression that Murdani's field intelligence can not be very accurate. One notes also that the 2,000 figure is larger than anything the Suharto regime has conceded for years. Thus, if Murdani is right, there are reasons for thinking that the armed resistance is getting stronger rather than weaker--an impression strengthened by the renewed appearance on the air of the guerrilla radio, and by the large numbers of Indonesian troops in East Timor. Confirmation of this impression comes from reports by two Western journalists who made brief visits to East Timor last year. Andree Feillard reported that in the Eastern sector of East Timor, only the few road links, the towns and their immediate surroundings were regarded by Indonesian officials themselves as "under full control." Jacques Guillon of Agence France-Presse recorded in July 1985 that he encountered no less than 13 military roadblocks along the 210 kilometer road between Dili and Los Palos, a part of the country supposedly completely pacified! On a visit to the military cemetery in Dili he found 84 new graves with death-dates between January 1 and July 3, 1985. What he might have discovered at other military cemeteries had he been permitted to visit them, we do not know--we do know, however, that Governor Carrascalao was enraged that he managed to see even the one in Dili. But casualties on this scale indicate that the independence struggle is very much alive. Meanwhile, Amnesty International has been documenting the summary trials of many dozens of so-called subversives. Amnesty is rightly concerned about the flagrantly abusive character of

these trials, in which not a single person has been acquitted, and where defence lawyers, none of them speaking Tetum, the national language of East Timor, have spent no more than one or two weeks on each case. But we may find confirmation, precisely from the scale of these abuses, of the anxiety and insecurity of the occupying forces. If East Timor were really the satisfied, pacified, integrated place that the Jakarta regime claims it is, such busy kangaroo courts would be wholly unnecessary.

I would like to summarize the conclusions that flow incontrovertibly from the data presented so far, before proceeding to the final portion of my testimony. I say incontrovertibly, because most of this data comes not from exiled East Timorese, not from representatives of Fretilin, and not from Indonesians opposed to the Suharto regime. The main source is the Suharto regime itself. If officials of this regime concede the deaths of at least 15% of the East Timorese population of 1975; the existence of thousands of orphans, abandoned children, as well as maimed and crippled people; overwhelming illiteracy; massive non-use of the Indonesian language; severe economic backwardness; a pervasive climate of fear and suspicion; strengthened guerrilla resistance; and the continuing need to isolate East Timor even from Indonesians--then we can be confident that, after eleven years of brutal military occupation, the so-called pacification has failed, not to speak of integration.

Let me now turn to Indonesia, and raise the question of what interests and whose interests are engaged in the continuing occupation of East Timor. The Indonesian people's perhaps? Indonesian nationalism has long been a deep and powerful force. It not only survived, but grew steadily stronger over three decades of political, and four years of armed, struggle against Dutch colonialism. In the spring of 1949, the

Dutch military succeeded not only in taking control of 95% of the towns in Indonesia, but also captured President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, the head of the infant national air force, and many other leaders. In February 1949 almost no one could have imagined that by December it would all be over, with the Netherlands transferring legal sovereignty to a free Sukarno and Hatta, as President and Vice-President of the United States of Indonesia. But this is what happened. It happened partly because Indonesian freedom-fighters continued their resistance in the rural areas, just as East Timorese freedom-fighters are doing today. It also happened because the United Nations had the courage and energy to make its presence felt, and to bring to bear the weight of world opinion. In addition, the allies of the Netherlands, most notably the United States, also made clear that they could no longer support Dutch policies.

At no point in this long, courageous struggle; nor under the remarkably free liberal parliamentary regime of 1950-59; nor under President Sukarno's Guided Democracy of 1959-65, with its militant anticolonialism; nor during the first ten years of General Suharto's regime did <u>any</u> significant Indonesian group express the slightest interest in East Timor. Only when this tiny, 400-year old Portuguese colony seemed finally about to become free, thirty years after Indonesia's own proclamation of independence, did a Jakarta government decide to intervene. This historical record shows that there is no genuine connection between Indonesian nationalism and East Timor. I can also say that I have never met an Indonesian, not a government official who evinced any emotional attachment to East Timor or identified with it. And if the Indonesian government itself sincerely believed that the

East Timorese were "brothers," it seems impossible to believe that it would deliberately have brought over 100,000 of them to their deaths; or would, to this day, make it so difficult for ordinary Indonesians to enter the territory of their "brothers."

Perhaps the interest was in the security of the Indonesian state? It has been said that the East Timorese were unlucky in the timing of their declaration of independence in 1975, only months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in Saigon and that of Lon Nol in Phnom Penh. Some observers are persuaded that these events greatly alarmed the Suharto regime, which in 1965-66 had destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party, supervised the massacre of probably half a million of its supporters, and imprisoned a further million. These observers believe that Suharto's entourage genuinely feared that an independent East Timor might prove a safe haven for Indonesian subversives and even offer military facilities to hostile foreign powers. In fact, there are good reasons to be skeptical of this argument. But even if it were true, the situation has completely changed since 1975. General Murdani has repeatedly been received as an honored guest in Hanoi; and while Jakarta still has no formal diplomatic ties with the CPR, trade relations flourish, and a number of high Indonesian officials have been on informal visits to Peking. Relations with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe are good, indeed Jakarta has recently been stressing the need for additional aid and trade. Most important of all, over the past two years General Murdani has repeatedly stated that Indonesia faces no external threat over the next decade. This being the case, there is today no plausible "national security" justification for the continuing occupation of East Timor.

What then? Only two small groups in Indonesia have a real interest in the occupation. One is a clique of officials and businessmen who have made great profits from monopoly control of East Timor's superb export coffee, and hope to do still better from the oil reputed to lie beneath its surrounding waters. The other is a not much larger group of senior military officers who devised and carried out the occupation, built their careers on it, and for reasons of face and power can not bear to contemplate its abandonment. They are only too aware of the fate of the Greek junta after the debacle in Cyprus, and of the Argentinian generals after the misadventure in the Malvinas. These two, small groups control Indonesian public life, but they do not represent the Indonesian people. Nor will they be around forever. There is absolutely no reason why, over the long haul, the nations of Indonesia and East Timor can not live side by side in amity--as indeed Indonesia does today with its other neighbors, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and--with obvious qualifications (resulting from the Suharto regime's brutal treatment of the population of West Irian), even Papua-Niugini.

The people of East Timor have suffered unimaginably for having done no more than claim those rights to self-determination on which the whole organization of the United Nations is based. It is therefore surely only right and proper for the United Nations to do now for East Timor what it did so successfully for Indonesia itself less than forty years ago.

The United Nations can do so first by reiterating and strengthening the principle of self-determination, and thus the right of the people of East Timor to decide their own political future. Conversely, it can

resolutely reject any claims to legitimacy for the Suharto regime's occupation of the country.

In the second place, it can lend active support to the efforts of Portugal to fulfill honorably its decolonizing responsibilities. It is striking evidence of Portuguese concern that as recently as last December, the Portuguese parliament passed unanimously a resolution opposing further Indonesian occupation of East Timor. I note that the Portuguese parliament is exactly the opposite of the rubber-stamp parliament in Jakarta, which is the product of rigged and manipulated elections, and over the past twenty years has not once enacted a substantial law on its own initiative. The Portuguese parliament is the product of genuinely free elections and contains representatives of every type of political view from left to right. Unanimity from this parliament on the East Timor questions indicates a popular concern about East Timor that is notably absent in Jakarta. Strong support from the United Nations would be extremely helpful to any positive Portuguese initiative. With such support, there is no reason in principle why Lisbon could not supervise a process whereby the people of East Timor could freely express their varied political views and exercise their fundamental right to self-determination.

Thirdly, the United Nations could strongly encourage Indonesia's closest friends to exert their influence and extend their good offices. As I mentioned earlier, a key factor in the successful decolonization of Indonesia in 1949 was a significant change in the policy of the United States, from more or less strong support of the Dutch position to a more sympathetic concern for Indonesia's rights--and this precisely at a time when many thought Indonesia's cause was lost. A major reason for

American success in changing the policy of The Hague was, aside from longstanding ties friendship, Washington's financial underwriting of the wartorn Dutch economy and of the war effort in Indonesia. The role played by the United States alone in 1949 can today be jointly reenacted by the United States and Japan. Ninety-five percent of the military equipment used in the initial Indonesian invasion in 1975 was American--even though their use for the invasion blatantly violated the terms of the 1958 US-Indonesian bilateral arms agreement. Jakarta's main arms purchases since 1975 have been of American provenance, and most have been of a kind developed for counter-guerrilla operations. Thus the United States bears the same kind of responsibility for Indonesian aggression in 1975-86 as it bore for Dutch aggression in 1946-49. Just for this reason, however, a change in U.S. policy would have a profound impact in Jakarta. At the same time the U.S. and Japan have long been the major underwriters of, and investors in, the Indonesian economy. In Jakarta both Tokyo and Washington are regarded as friends, with no interest whatever in causing domestic political turmoil. All the more reason, therefore, why a change in Japanese and American positions on East Timor would be taken very seriously in Indonesia. It seems to me that the U.N., and particularly those members who have the closest ties with the U.S. and Japan, could, and should, do their utmost to encourage these two states to exert in a new, constructive way the influence they clearly have in Jakarta. The peaceful liberation of East Timor would not only end the eleven-year nightmare its people have suffered, but would also remove a grave stain on Indonesia's good name, not to speak of stopping a continuing drain on the lives of its ordinary soldiers and the resources of its hardpressed, ordinary people.